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BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final decision in a civil matter arising from
the Second District Court, Davis County. This case was originally filed in the
Utah Supreme Court and the case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2a-3, Utah
Code Ann. (1953, as amended) [hereinafter referred to as "UCA"].
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
See Plaintiff-Appellants Brief, pages 1-3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was brought in March, 1990 by Floor Coverings by
Certified, Inc., a Utah corporation [herein referred to as "Floor Coverings" or as
the "Plaintiff"] (R.309-317, Amended Finding of Fact 2) against Stacy B. Morgan
and Kristin P. Morgan [herein referred to jointly as "the Morgans" or as the
"Defendants"], (R.309-317 Amended Finding of Fact 1), in an attempt to recover
for floor coverings [labor and materials] that were supplied to the Defendants by
Plaintiff and to foreclose a mechanic's lien on certain real property of the
Morgans.
COMMENT ON DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants make representations on page 5 of their Brief [first full
paragraph], concerning what occurred at a Sheriffs sale. This statement is not
1

correct and it is not supported anywhere in the record. As a result, it should be
disregarded by the Appeals Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The lower court erred when it granted the Judgment because:
1.

The Defendants waived their right to assert any defense that

were not pled, including that the Notice of Lien was illegal and unenforceable, the
issue was not tried by consent and the Defendants never sought relief to have their
Answer amended.
2.

The Notice of Lien satisfies the statutory requirements, but to

the extent it does not, it was in substantial compliance with the law.
3.

A judgment should have been entered against the Morgans

because they did not have a contractors bond.
4.

The Defendants Answer should have been stricken under Rule

11 because it was not signed and they should not have been able to present
evidence in support of their defenses at the trial.
5.

The Defendants are not entitled to an award for attorneys fees

and are estopped to assert that they were the successful party below.
ARGUMENT
Petitioner asserts the following points of law in support hereof:

2

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellate Courts in Utah are to accord no particular deference to

the trial court's legal conclusions, Hoth v. White. 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (Ct.
App. 1990), Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 R.T.2d 467, (Utah
1989), but should not set aside the factual findings unless they are against the clear
weight of the evidence. Id.
II.

DEFENDANTS WAIVED RIGHT TO ASSERT DEFENSES NOT
PLEAD
A.

TRIED BY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONSENT
Under the Utah case law, a defendant does not have to raise an

"avoidance" or an "affirmative defense" in his pleading if the issue is tried by the
express or implied consent of the parties. Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. 682
P.2d 287 (Utah 1984).
Defendants rely in their Brief on the case of General Insurance Co.
v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.. 565 P.2d 505 (Utah 1976). In that decision, the
Supreme Court held that the way to amend pleadings by implication during the
trial is "by the introduction of evidence without objection". Id. at 505 (emphasis
added).
In the case sub judice. Plaintiffs counsel made a motion in limne
[R.T. 3-6] at the start of the trial and objected to the introduction of evidence in

3

support of any defenses that were not plead by the Defendants. Therefore, there
is no basis for finding that the Defendant's Answer was amended implicitly, by the
introduction of evidence without objection at the trial. With Plaintiffs objection
in the record, the only defenses that were properly at issue were those that were
listed in the Morgans' Answer.
Defense counsel did not say anything concerning the validity of the
lien prior to his closing argument. He made no motion to amend the Defendants'
Answer before, during or after the trial, to include any defenses that were not
pled.

He failed to take these remedial steps despite the fact that (a) he had

received the Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum (R. 241-251) in which the Plaintiff had
objected to the Defendants' assertion of any defenses that had not been pled
[including that the Lien was defective], and (b) Plaintiff had presented a motion
in limne to prevent the introduction of evidence on any defenses that had not been
pled. Therefor, the defenses that had not been pled were not tried expressly or by
implication, nor was the Answer amended to include their defenses.
B.

DEFENSES NOT RAISED WHEN THERE IS NO GENERAL
DENIAL
Defendants assert in their Brief (p. 11) that a party does not have to

plead objections to a complaint because they "are preserved by the denials [set
forth in the answer] of the allegations contained within [said complaint]". This

4

appears to be a partially correct statement of the law in Utah based upon the
General Insurance case. That Court determined that "any matter that does not tend
to controvert the [[plaintiffs] prima facie case shall be pleaded, and is not put in
issue by a general denial under Rule 8(b)". 545 P.2d at 504. Stated positively,
it says that general denials preserve the defenses that arise as a direct consequence
of the plaintiffs prima facie case.
However, this proposition does not benefit the Morgans.

Their

Answer [Exhibit "E"] does not contain any general denials of the allegations of the
Complaint. All it contains are the following affirmative defenses: (1) they were
only acting as agents for Miles Construction when they went through Don Smith
to have the carpeting and vinyl installed at their place and the agreement was with
Don Smith, not Plaintiff; (2) they were not acting as a general contractor; (3)
Miles Construction had a bond; (4) they were not the owners of the subject
property at the time they had the job was ordered; and (5) they were not unjustly
enriched.
Assume arguendo that the Morgans did not have to plead the defenses
which they relied upon at the trial. Since there were no general denials to the
prima facie case, then, under the General Insurance analysis, their defenses were
not raised by the pleadings in this case. This is supported by the fact that Rule 12
(b) requires a defendant to plead "every defense, in law or fact". Therefore, the
5

Defendants unpled defenses were waived.
C.

DEFENSES INCLUDED BY A GENERAL DENIAL
The Defendants assert, based on the General Insurance case, that they

did not have to plead their defenses to the mechanic's lien case because they would
"merely controvert plaintiffs prima facie case". In order, to consider the Morgans
assertion, we will look at the Plaintiffs prima facie case and compare that with
what the Defendant's were attempting to prove as their defenses.
As a general rule, a claimant's prima facie case is:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

the name of the reputed owner or the name
of the record owner of the property;
the name of the person by whom he was employed or to
whom he furnished the equipment or materials;
that his materials were installed upon, or he
did labor relating to, construction at the
property;
the charge for the materials and installation,
or their value;
the time when the first and last labor was
performed;
that a preliminary notice, if applicable, was
served on the contractor;
a description of the property;
that a Notice lis pendens was prepared and
recorded; and
that a Notice of lien was recorded and
served.

§38-1-1, et seq., UCA ; 53 Am.Jur.2d Mechanics's Lien §§375-382.
In this case, the Defendants attempted to defeat the Plaintiffs lien case

6

by showing, among other things, that (a) they did not order the job from the
Plaintiff, but Don Smith did, (b) the amount listed on the Lien as the amount due
was not correct, (c) there were disputes with Plaintiff as to billing and service, (d)
Morgans were not the contractors, (f) Morgans were not the owners of the
property, (e) there was no contract between Morgans and the Plaintiff, (f) there
was nothing subscribed and sworn to by Mr. Delahunty, (g) the Lien failed to
identify the proper parties that entered into the contract, (h) there was no
verification on the lien, (h) Floor Coverings contract for the carpet and vinyl was
with Mr. Smith and not with them, and (i) the Lien failed to identify the true
contractor and the true owner.
While some of these asserted defenses may arise from the allegations
of the Complaint, many of them do not. For example, the Complaint did not
embrace the idea that Don Smith had anything to do with the transaction nor was
it apparent from the Notice of Lien. Defendants claim that the Lien was somehow
unenforceable because Don Smith was the one who ordered the materials.
Plaintiffs could prove their prima facie case without mentioning Don Smith.
Plaintiffs could, also, prove their prima facie case without mentioning
or alluding to (a) any billing or service disputes, (b) any contractual relationship
with the Defendants, (c) the amount listed on the face of the Lien Notice as being
due, (d) details concerning the Lien's verification, etc.
7

In reading the Plaintiffs Complaint, it is not apparent from its face
that the Notice of Lien would not be enforceable for any of the reasons advanced
by Defendants at the trial. Since their defenses were not apparent from the
pleading, then it was incumbent upon the Morgans to plead them as defenses.
Even if we assume that the Morgans' Answer contained a general
denial [which it does not], these are not the kind of claims that would have arisen
automatically from the face of the Complaint. At the least, they are "matters
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense" which must be pled under Rule
8(c).
Defendants waived these defenses, and they should not have been able
to present the same at the trial. The trial court committed error when it made
findings of fact and reached a legal conclusion based upon a waived defense.
III.

TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED CLAIM BASED UPON
MECHANICS LIEN
A.

CHANGE IN STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The requirements for a mechanics' lien notice that were in force

during this case, §38-1-7, UCA. provided that it contain:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known, or,
if not known, the name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was
employed or to whom he furnished the equipment
or material;
8

(c) the time when the first and last labor was
performed . . .;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for
identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his
authorized agent and an acknowledgment or
certificate as required under Chapter 3, Title 57.
The Defendants, in their Brief (p. 13), go to great lengths to discuss
"the exact procedure for verification" of a Notice of Lien. They claim this
procedure is not set forth in the statute, but has been determined by case law, and
is applicable to the present case.

By way of illustration, they discuss the

correctness of the lien verifications in these major cases: Project Unlimited. Inc.
v. Copper State Thrift & Loan. 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990) ["Project"]:
Worthington & Kimball Constr. Co. v. C & A Development Co. 777 P.2d 475
(Utah 1989); Mickelson v. Craigco. Inc.. 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 1989); and First
Sec. Mortg. Co. v. Hansen. 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981).
Defendants fail to take into consideration that the liens in all of those
cases arose under the mechanics' lien law that was in effect prior to 1984. Since
that time, new laws were adopted that made key changes in the statutory language.
In the most recent of these cases, the court in Project noted that the
purpose behind the lien statute is remedial, and that a "lien, once acquired by labor
. . . should not . . . be defeated by technicalities, when no rights of others are
9

infringed, and no express command of the statute is disregarded." [citing Eccles
Lumber Co. v. Martin. 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 716.]. The Project case
indicated that the Utah courts and the legislature have embraced the modern view,
which dispenses with arbitrary rules that have no demonstrable value in a
particular situation.
One example of the adoption of the modern view by the legislature,
according to Project court, was the enactment in 1985 of a new mechanic's lien
law:
Requirements under the 1984 version of this law [§38-1-7]
which are no longer part of the statute include (a) actual
verification of the statements in the lien, (b) a statement of [the
claimant's] demand . . . . [,and] a statement of the terms of .
. . his contract.
798 P.2d at 744, fh. 4 (emphasis added)
Since Floor Covering's Lien was recorded long after the changes in
the law, then no verification is required in the present case. The decisions cited
by the Defendants which discuss that issue at length are inapplicable.
In the Project decision, the Court, also, discussed another change in
the lien law [in 1989]. In lieu of the burdensome verification, the legislature
required that current lien notices should contain an "acknowledgment or
certificate", and this acknowledgement or certificate only had to comply with
Chapter 3, Title 57. LI, at 746, fn. 8. The purpose behind the simplification of
the Lien requirements was so that legal minutiae would not triumph over the rights
10

of most mechanics lien claimants.
B.

COMPLIANCE WITH CHAPTER 3, TITLE 57
The statute requires that a Lien notice contain "the signature of the

lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or certificate as
required under Chapter 3, Title 57. . . .".

§38-l-7(e), UCA.

The first sub-section of Chapter 3, Title 57, allows for the recording
of any document in the recorders office if it contains one of the following — a
"certificate of [its] acknowledgment, or of the proof of [its] execution, or a jurat
as defined in Section 46-1-2, or other notarial certificate containing the word
"subscribed and sworn" or their substantial equivalent, [and] that is signed and
certified by the officer taking the acknowledgement, proof or jurat." §57-3-1,
UCA. The second sub-section, provides that notarial acts affecting real property
"shall be performed in accordance with Chapter 1, Title 46". kL
1.

Jurat

One option available that satisfies the requirements of section 1, is the
use of a notarial "jurat". Under the Notary Public act, a "jurat" is defined to be
"a notarial act in which the notary certifies that the signer, whose identity is
personally known to the notary or proven on the basis of satisfactory evidence, has
made, in the notary's presence, a voluntary signature and taken an oath or
affirmation vouching for the truthfulness of the signed document." §46-1-2(3).
11

The Notice of Lien [Exhibit "D"] had an attachment which was
executed by a notary and stated that: "before me, the undersigned notary,
personally appeared Alan Delahunty, as the Vice President of Floor Coverings.
. ., who was personally known to me [or whose identity was satisfactorily proved
to me) to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and
who swore or affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose,
that the document is truthful, and that the document was signed on behalf of said
corporation, by authority of a Resolution of the corporation's board of directors
and acknowledged that the corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed
is the seal of said corporation", (emphasis added)
In comparing the Plaintiff's Lien Notice with the jurat requirements,
we find that (a) the Mr. Delahunty's identity was properly determined, (b) in the
notary's presence, he made a voluntary signature of the Lien, and (c) he took an
oath or affirmation vouching for the truthfulness of the Lien. Therefore, the Lien
was properly recorded under Title 3, Chapter 57, and satisfies the related lien
provision.
2.

Acknowledgement or Certificate

The Court could determine that when the Lien statute uses the
specificate words "acknowledged" or "certified", it means as those terms are
defined in Title 3, Chapter 57.
12

Under Title 3, a "certificate of acknowledgement" is acceptable if it
contains the words "acknowledged before me or their substantial equivalent". §572a-6, UCA.
Under the relevant part of §57-2a-2, the phrase "acknowledged before
me" is defined as:
(a) that the person acknowledging appeared before the
person taking the acknowledgement;
(b) that he acknowledged that he executed the document;
(c) that, in the case of:

(ii) a corporation, the officer or agent
acknowledged that he held a position or title set
forth in the document or certificate, he signed the
document on behalf of the corporation by proper
authority, and the document was the act of the
corporation for the purposes stated in it.

(d) that the person taking the acknowledgement:
(i) either knew or had satisfactory evidence that
the person acknowledging was the person named in
the document or certificate; and
(ii) in the case of a person executing a document
in a representative capacity, either had satisfactory
evidence or received a the sworn statement that the
person had the proper authority to execute the
document.
In comparing the Acknowledgment statute to the Notice of Lien, we
find that (a) Mr. Delahunty personally appeared before the notary and he
13

acknowledged that (b) he executed the Lien, (c) he was the Vice President of the
Plaintiff corporation, (d) he signed the Lien on behalf of the Plaintiff with proper
authority [by Resolution of the corporation's board of directors], (e) the Lien was
the act of the corporation, and (f) his identity was properly determined. As a
result, the Lien has a "certifcate of acknowledgment" that satisfies all of the
statutory requirements and should meet the related lien provision as well.
The provisions for an "acknowledgement", also, indicate that the
Statutory Short Form which is set out in the statute "is acceptable under any law
of this state." §57-2a-7, UCA. That Form is:
STATE OF

)
) ss.
)

COUNTY OF

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this (date) by
(person acknowledging, title, or representative capacity, if any).
Signature of Person taking Acknowledgement, Title
[seal]
My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

Since this form contains the words "acknowledged before me", then
it has to meet the same requirements as the Certificate of Acknowledgement,
discussed above.
3.

Substantial Compliance

Even if the Acknowledgement or Certificate portions of Plaintiffs

14

Lien do not satisfy every single requirement of the law, substantial compliance is
all that is required. The Project decision stated that "even assuming that the
legislature intended the inclusion of the jurat which conformed with the notary
statute, substantial compliance would certainly be sufficient to satisfy that
requirement".
It should be noted that, in drafting the notary attachment to the Lien,
Plaintiff used the recommended forms for Notary Certificates found in the Utah
Notary Public Guide [Utah Department of Business Regulation, 1988] [Exhibit
"F"]. Forms A, B, and C set forth almost identical information to that contained
in Plaintiffs Notice. Thus, the Notice's Certificate should be assumed to be
correct.
Even if the Plaintiff had to satisfy the old "verification" standard,
since they met the "jurat" requirements, under the Project case that is sufficient as
a verification.
C.

FIRST ALLEGED LIEN DEFECT
The first defect found by the trial court in the Notice of Lien was that

amount claimed as being due and owing was incorrect. As was discussed in the
Project case, under the prior lien law a claimant had to include a statement of his
demand, less any set-offs, and a statement of the terms of his contract. These
provisions were removed from the Lien law to make the mechanics lien process
15

simpler and less burdensome. Trial courts should not require a Lien claimant to
do what the legislature has not. As a general proposition, a claimant need not
satisfy any tests that are not specifically set forth in the mechanic's lien law.
Buehner Block v.Glezos. 310 P.2d 517 (Utah 1957) [if notice satisfies the statutory
requirements, then it does not have to set forth any other information which might
be useful or desirable].
The Lien in the present case satisfies the law in this regard and
should have been enforced by the lower court.

D.

SECOND ALLEGED LIEN DEFECT
The next defect found by the trial court in the Notice of Lien was that

the persons listed on the Lien [the Morgans] were not the ones who hired Plaintiff.
The mechanics lien statute allows the lien claimant an option to list the
"name of the person by whom he was employed or [the name of the person] to
whom he furnished the equipment or material"

§38-1-7(b), UCA [emphasis

added]. Even if the Morgans were not the persons who hired Floor Coverings,
they were the persons to whom the material was furnished. The trial court entered
a judgment against the Morgans based upon unjust enrichment (R.309-317,
Amended Conclusion of Law 4) because they were the persons who had benefitted
from the installation of the carpet and vinyl. Therefore, by listing the Morgans
on the Lien as the persons to whom Floor Coverings furnished the materials, the
16

second part of subsection (b) is satisfied.
Moreover, the Project Court [followed in the case of For-Shore Co.
v. Early. 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (1992)], adopted a more liberal standard in
reviewing objections to the descriptive terms in a lien notice. The test they applied
is "whether interested parties have been informed of the existence of the lien and
whether the lien has misled or prejudiced those parties". 798 P.2d at 747. If the
lien notice informs the interested parties that the lien exists on identifiable
property, and the complaining party has not been misled by the descriptive
provisions of the lien, then the courts will tend towards finding substantial
compliance.
In applying this test to the facts before the Court, the Lien Notice
[Exhibit "C"] informs the Morgans of the fact that Floor Coverings is claiming a
lien against a particular piece of property and when the work was performed.
There is no evidence in the record that the Morgans were misled or prejudiced by
any portion the Notice's description. Therefore, the Notice is in substantial
compliance with the lien law and the lower court erred in finding that the Notice
of Lien was defective in this regard.
E.

THIRD GROUP OF ALLEGED LIEN DEFECTS
Judge Cornaby found the following technical problems with Lien:
(a) the signature of the corporate Plaintiff was that of an officer
17

only.
(b) the corporate officer did not state under oath that the
contents of the Lien were correct.
(c) the notary was the person "who swore or affirmed to me that
he signed it voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the document is truthful".
For the most part, these issues are subsumed in the discussion above
as to whether the Lien had a proper "Acknowledgement or Certificate".

In

addition, the argument in the Plaintiffs Brief (pages 17 - 21) deals with the fact
that the signature was that of the Plaintiff corporation.
Assuming arguendo that the Notice falls short in some particular with
respect to satisfying the lien law requirements, under the Project case analysis, it
is in substantial compliance with the lien law.
IV.

JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERED BASED UPON
FAILURE TO HAVE A CONTRACTOR'S BOND
A.

ISSUE WAS RAISED BELOW
The Defendants assert that because the issue as to their failure to have

a bond was not set forth in the pre-trial order, then it was not raised below. They
assert that the case of Estate of Wolfinger v. Wolfinger. 793 P.2d 393 (Utah App.
1991) supports that position, but that is not true. The pre-trial order in Wolfinger.
listed two issues for trial, but the trial court decided the case on a third issue. The
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Court upheld that result. It considered the interplay between Rule 16(b) [which
includes pre-trial orders] and Rule 15(b), which allows for liberalized amendment
of the pleadings to conform with the evidence at the trial. The Wolfinger court
relied upon the case of Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168, 170, which held that
"where no objection was made to the introduction of evidence it is deemed that the
Court modified the pretrial order as a matter of its own discretion." In Wolfinger.
since the defendant made no objection to the introduction of the evidence in that
case, and demonstrated no prejudice as a result, then she exposed herself to
whatever ruling the evidence would support.
This decision is supported by the general rule which allows for the
amendment of the pleadings by implication during the trial "by the introduction of
evidence without objection". General Insurance Co. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp..
565 P.2d 505 (Utah 1976).
In this case, the Morgans did not object to the introduction of evidence
relating to their failure to have a bond (R.T. 81), and they have not shown that
they suffered any prejudice as a result. The trial judge entered a finding [24] and
a conclusion [9] based upon the bond theory. Therefore, the issue as to the
Morgans' failure to have a contractors bond was properly before the trial court and
raised on appeal.
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B.

NO RELIANCE ON MILES CONSTRUCTION BOND

The Defendants claim that they should not be required to obtain a
bond if Miles Construction had one.
In this case, the Morgans received an allowance for carpeting from the
builder, Miles Construction, but the Morgans had to make their own arrangements
for the purchase and installation of the floor coverings at their new home. (R.T.
93 and 99).

To that extent, the Morgans were acting independently of the

construction company. As such, they had to act to protect the rights of any
laborers or materialman who supplied the floor coverings at their direction.
C.

PLAINTIFF WAS A MATERIALMAN
CONSTRUCTION BOND STATUTE

UNDER

In Defendant's Brief they rely upon the case of Bailey v. Parker. 778
P.2d 1005 (Utah App. 1989) to support the position that the Plaintiff was not a
"materialman" under thee Contractors' Bond statute, which relieves the Morgans
from having to obtain a bond for the carpet work.
The Bailey case is similar to the present case, but it differs at a telling
point. The buyers in Bailey had been in contact with a Mr. Smith to look at
samples for floor covering. The buyers agreed to purchase carpet only, from Mr.
Smith, and contracted with another person for its installation.
The court held that the sole service provided by Mr. Smith was to sell
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the buyers carpeting, and he purchased the carpeting from a carpet vendor on
account, not as part of the remodeling for the house. Therefore, the suing carpet
vendor was not a materialman under the bond statute.
By contrast, in this case the Defendants entered into a contract with
Don Smith. Mr. Smith was to arrange for the sale and installation of the floor
coverings by the Plaintiff. (R.T. 147, 149, 151, and 158). The Plaintiff dealt
directly with the Morgans, supplied the carpeting and vinyl from their store, and
did the installation. (R.T. 9-30). Both parties knew that the Plaintiffs materials
and labor would be used in construction work on the Morgans new home.
Since the case at bar did not involve the purchase of floor coverings
independently from its installation, then the Plaintiff is a materialman who's labor
should have been covered by the Morgans' bond.
D.

CONTRACT EXCEEDING $2,000
CONSTRUCTION BOND STATUTE

UNDER

See argument in Plaintiffs Brief, pages 21 - 23.
V.

DEFENDANTS WAIVED DEFENSES IN UNSIGNED ANSWER
Rule 11, URCP. provides that "[i]f a pleading . . . is not signed, it

shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader . . . .". [emphasis added]
Defendants do not contest that an unsigned pleading should be
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stricken. They assert, instead, that the Answer was signed. However, if that were
true, then they would have pointed to the place in the record that supports that view.
Without said support from the record, the Defendants' Answer should be stricken,
Moore's Federal Practice ^11.002[1], and judgment should be entered for the
Plaintiff.
VI.

DEFENDANTS ARE
ATTORNEYS FEES
A.

NOT

ENTITLED

TO

AN

AWARD

OF

UNDER RULE 33 OF THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Defendants assert a right to an award of attorneys fees under Rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for a frivolous appeal. In order to address this
issue, the Plaintiff has set forth below an analysis as to the general basis for this
appeal.
The relevant portion of the mechanic's lien statue lists five provisions
that relate to the drafting of a notice of lien. §38-1-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended). The trial court in this case found that the Plaintiffs Notice of Lien
satisfied some, but not all of the requirements of that statute. The Utah courts have
consistently taken the position that a lien claimant does not have to comply with every
facet of the notice requirements. His lien will be valid and enforceable if it is in
substantial compliance with the Mechanics Lien Statute. Graff v. Boise Cascade
Corp.. 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983); Roberts Investment Co. v. Gibbons & Reed
Concrete Prod. Co.. 449 P.2d 116, 22 Utah 2d 105 (Utah 1969).
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In addition, the position of the Utah Courts and legislature has been in
flux. They have now adopted the modern view allowing for compliance with the
statute where the lien notice informs the interested parties that the lien exists on
identifiable property, and the complaining party has not been misled by the descriptive
provisions of the lien. Moreover, the legislature has changed the law to remove the
lien verification requirement, and replace it with just an "Acknowledgement or
Certificate". There have been no Utah decisions that have dealt with issues arising
under this new statutory language.
Since the Plaintiff satisfied most of the lien requirements, and the law
and approach the courts have adopted is more liberal than before, then it is only
logical for Floor Coverings to argue on appeal that the lower court misapplied the law
in this case, because their lien was in substantial compliance.
Plaintiffs counsel has been representing them for almost fifteen years.
They are involved in mechanics' lien situations on a continuing basis, and wanted to
appeal to determine how the new law would be interpreted.
From the extensive arguments set forth in the Plaintiffs briefs in this
matter, it is apparent that this appeal has not been filed in violation to Rule 33.
B.

UNDER RULE 68 (B)
Rule 68(b) does not provide a basis for an award of attorneys fees. If

the Plaintiff is successfully on mechanics' lien or contractor's bond issues on appeal,
then they would be entitled to an award for costs.
23

C.

UNDER MECHANICS LIEN STATUTE
Defendants are not entitled to an award for attorneys fees because (a)

they did not plead any such request, (b) they agreed that they were not entitled to
such an award, and (c) they have not shown an equitable basis for relief.
Since Plaintiffs counsel made a motion in limne [R.T. 3-6] at the start
of the trial and objected to the introduction of evidence in support of any matters
that were not plead by the Defendants, then this issue was not tried by express or
implied consent. With. Plaintiffs objection, the only matters that were properly at
issue for trial were those listed in the Morgans' Answer, and they did not include a
request for attorneys fees.
The mechanic's lien statute provides that "[i]n nay action to enforce any
lien, the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee".
§38-1-18, UCA In his closing argument, Mr. Vanderlinden, in reliance on this
section, stated, the "[s]tatute talks about the successful party

I don't think that

anybody has been the successful party." (R.T. 195). Defendants should be estopped
from claiming now that they were the successful party.
A general rule to be applied in judicial proceedings is that a party will
not be allowed to take a position on a matter that is directly contrary to that which he
previously assumed, where he is chargeable with full knowledge of the facts and
another will be prejudiced thereby. Estate of Christensen v. Christensen. 655 P.2d
646 (Utah 1982); Caldwell v. Anschutz Drilling Co.. 13, U.2d 177, 369 P.2d 964
24

(1962).
Certainly, in this case, Mr. Vanderlinden was fully cognizant of the
facts, and Plaintiff will be prejudiced in expending the time and resources to fight this
issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the preceding argument, the lower court's judgment should
be reversed to the extent it denied Plaintiff the right to foreclosure as prayed on the
mechanics lien against the property of the Morgans [with a deficiency if necessary],
and for their failure to have a bond, and judgment should be entered for Plaintiff, in
the sum of $2,040, and with an award for a fee for filing and recording the Notice
of Lien [$100], for foreclosure costs, for all pre-judgment costs, and for an award of
attorneys fees through the end of the trial in accordance with the evidence that was
introduced at the trial, and for an award of fees and costs following the trial and for
the appeal, and for after accruing fees and costs.
DATED this 14th day of July, 1992.
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR
& ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorn^ys-^TPlaiBt iff-Appellant
Paul Franklin Farr
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the foregoing
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid,firstclass,
to:
Steve C. Vanderlinden, Esq.
STEVE C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
1133 North Main, Suite 200
Layton, UT 84041
this 15th day of July, 1992.
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Steven C. Vanderlinden #3314
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendants
1133 North Main, Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone (801) 544-9930

o c

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED,
INC.,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 900747303CN

STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN
P. MORGAN,

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 31st
day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District
Court Judge. The Court, having previously entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGES and DECREES
judgment against the Plaintiff in the sum of ?80.40, together with
post-judgment costs and interest.
DATED this j £

day of

/^-T^/^/-

, 1991.

BY THE COURT:
S

~L

C~£_

^j^x^DouglasTrr/Cornaby
D i s t r i c t Court Judge
c:\wp\docs\misc\morgan.fof

0053935
rn aacn
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Steven C. Vanderlinden #3 314
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendants
113 3 North Main, Suite 2 00
Layton, Utah 84041
Telephone (801) 544-9930

.••• M. ~o
«.l .1-00

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, :
:
INC. ,
:
Plaintiff,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT

vs.
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN
P. MORGAN,

:

Civil No. 900747303CN
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 31st
day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District
Court Judge•

The Plaintiff was present and represented by his

attorney, Paul Franklin Farr. The Defendants were also present and
represented by their attorney, Steven C. Vanderlinden.

The court

having heard testimony by both parties, and their witnesses, and
having received exhibits as evidence, and the court having reviewed
the testimony of the parties and good cause appearing; hereby
enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Defendants are residents of Davis County, Utah.

2.

The Plaintiff was a corporation duly

organized and

validly existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its

principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and
was, at all times relevant, in the retail floor coverings business
[hereinafter referred to sometimes as "Floor Coverings"].
3.

On or about the 15th day of November, 1989, Plaintiff

furnished the first materials and labor and, on or about November
17, 1989, Plaintiff furnished the last of said materials and labor
in performing the job [Invoice 27 02] at the Property.
4.

The property located at 773 South 825 East in Davis

County, Utah [hereinafter the "Property"] was a residence, and the
Defendants1 clos€>d on their purchase of the same on November 24,
1991.

Defendants were the owners of said Property at the time the

Notice of Lien was recorded against the same.
5.

That Plaintiff thought the prices to be paid to them for

the installation and the purchase of the carpet was $11.25 and the
price to be paid for the purchase and the installation of vinyl was
$9.75.
6.

That the Defendant thought that the price to be paid to

Plaintiff for the purchase and installation of the carpet was
$10.75 per yard and $9.75 per yard to purchase and install the
vinyl.
7.

That the Defendants believed they were entering into a

contract with Don Smith and the Plaintiff believed they were
entering into a contract with the Defendants.
8.

That

no

contract existed

Defendants.
-2-

between the Plaintiff and

9.

On November 24, 1989, at the closing of the Defendant's

home, the Defendants paid Miles Construction Company Contractor
$1,500.00 for the purchase and installation of the carpet and vinyl
for their home.
10.

In June, 1990, Miles

Construction

Company

gave the

Defendants $1,500.00 for the carpet and vinyl that was purchased
in their home so that the Defendants could send the money on to the
Plaintiff.
11.

Plaintiff sent the Defendants an invoice [Invoice No.

2702], relating to said job, shortly after the work was completed
on November 17, 1990 seeking the immediate payment of the same.
The amount asserted to be owing therein was $2,115.00.
12.

Since said invoice was not paid by Defendants,- then

Plaintiff mailed a Preliminary Notice of Intent to File a Lien to
the Defendants about January 3, 1990. On January 19, 1990, Floor
Coverings caused a Notice of Lien to be filed with the Office of
the Davis County Recorder [Entry No. 880784, Book 1332, Page 818,
hereinafter "Notice of Lien"].
13.

On June 12, 1990, Defendants sent Plaintiff a check for

$2,040.00 for the carpet and vinyl purchased and installed in their
home by. the Plaintiff.
-14.

That the Plaintiff urged the Court to find an accord and

satisfaction pursuant to the Answer filed by the defendants on
April 9, 1990. The Court did not do so. This action was filed on
March 15, 1990.

On March 23, 1990, Allen Delahunty and Stacy
-3-

Morgan met at the propertyremeasured.

A step was repaired and the floor was

At the conclusion the Plaintiff agreed to deduct

$75.00 from the bill due to its error.

The balance due was

$2,040.00.
15.

That on June 26, 1990, the Court received the Plaintiff ! s

Motion for Summary Judgment, to strike Defendants' Answer, and for
default judgment.

Also filed on the same date was an Affidavit

signed by Alan Delahunty.

The Plaintiff's attorney also signed

this Affidavit wherein he claimed to have mailed a copy to the
Defendants on May 18, 1990. That on June 10, 1990, the Defendants
mailed to Plaintiff's attorney, Paul Franklin Farr, a check for
$2,040.00

to

settle the matter.

The Defendants

mailed the

$2,040.00 check to the Plaintiff in an offer to settle the .case,
although no writing expressed such intention.

The Court awarded

the Plaintiff judgment on August 1, 1990 for $2,040.00 plus $136.00
interest, plus lien costs $100.00, plus lien foreclosure costs of
$308.00, plus a reasonable attorney fee of $1,000.00.
was $3,584.00.

The total

The Plaintiff's "counsel held Defendants' check

until after the judgment was awarded and then cashed it on August
7, 1990.

On October 11, 1990, Steven~JZ.

Vanderlinden made an

appearance for the Defendants and filed *a Motion to Set Aside the
Summary Judgment.

On October 18, 1990, the Plaintiff caused a

public sale to be made of Defendants' property pursuant to the
judgment.

The Plaintiff's attorney bid $3,855.10 at the public

sale, claiming that to be the amount owing.
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The Court found the

actions of Plaintiff's attorney outrageous and granted a temporary
restraining order.
16.

That Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning that

they owed the Plaintiff money for the carpet and vinyl installed
in their home but have consistently claimed it was less than the
$2,115.00 claimed by Plaintiff.
17.

That the Plaintiff billed the Defendant for 50 yards of

vinyl at $9.75 per yard for a total of $487.50 and 13 0 yards of
carpet at $11.25 per yard for a total of $1,4 63.53.

The total for

both the carpet and vinyl was $1,951.00 before taxes, and $2,115.00
with taxes and $40.00 miscellaneous fees.
18.

That

after

the

liens

had

been

filed,

Plaintiff

acknowledged a $75.00 error in its calculations and stated that his
bill should be $2,040.00.
19.

That because there was no contract between the parties,

and different prices were discussed, the Court determined that
$9.75 per yard for the purchase and installation of the vinyl is
reasonable and $11.25 for the purchase and installation of the
carpet is reasonable.
20.

Three expert witnesses were called on the total yardage

of carpet and vinyl installed in the home, none being a party to
the lawsuit.

Said witnesses testified that they went to the home

to measure the carpet.

Dennis Vanderlinden testified that there

was 121.3 yards of carpet installed with a value of $1,3 64.94, and
40 yards of vinyl installed for a purchase price of $390.00 and a
-5-

total price of the carpet and vinyl of $1,754.94.

David Searle

testified that there was 122.2 yards of carpet for a value of
$1,374.75 and 45 yards of vinyl for a value of $438.75 for a total
purchase price for both the carpet and vinyl of $1,813.50.

Dean

Chidester testified that there was 118.67 yards of carpet for a
value of $1,335.04 and 40 yards of vinyl for a value of $390.00 for
a total purchase price of $1,725.04.
21.

That the difference between the high and the low figures

testified to in court is approximately $150.00.
22.

That the difference in the amount owed is significant to

the Defendants.
23.

That the amount owed in the notice lien is incorrect.

24.

That no one testified as to whether or not there was a

bond in place. However, the Court assumes that there was no bond.
25.

That the lien statute does not require privity between

the parties and Plaintiff properly listed the Defendants as the
owner or reputed owner of the property.
26-

That the lien filed by the Plaintiff correctly stated

when the labor was performed, November 17, 1989, and gave a proper
description

of

the

property,

however, " the

signature

corporation is the * signature of an officer only.

of ,the

The corporate

officer does not state under oath that the contents of the lien are
correct.

The notary on the lien is the person who states "who

swore or affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily, for its
stated purpose, and the document is truthful."
-6-

27.

That Plaintiff incorrectly listed the person by whom he

was employed even though he believed the Defendants were the ones
that hired him.
28.

That based on the above, the lien is unenforceable.

29.

Plaintiff is to be paid for unjust enrichment in the

amount of $1,800.00 plus $40.00 preparation and the appropriate
sales tax of $119.60 for a total amount to be paid of $1,959.60.
30.

That Plaintiff presently has in his possession $2,040.00

of Plaintifffs money meaning the Plaintiff owes the Defendant
$30.40.
31.

That each party is to bear their own attorney's fees and

costs incurred herein.
32.

That the previous sum deposited with the Court in the

amount of $3,855.10 is to be returned to the Defendants.
33.

Shortly after the work was completed on November 17,

1990, Plaintiff mailed Defendants1
immediate payment of the same.

Invoice 2702,

The Plaintiff

seeking the

asserted that

$2,115.00 was the correct principal amount then due and owing.
34.

Thereafter, no payment was made by the Defendants within

the next thirty days. As a result, Plaintiff contacted Defendants
to request payment.
35.

In this case no payment was thereafter made and Plaintiff

sent Defendants a Preliminary Notice of Intent to file a lien.
36.

In the sale of the carpeting for installation at the

Property, Plaintiff acted with the expectation of being compensated
-7-

therefor

in an amount equal to

the reasonable

value of the

materials and services furnished, and it was not acting as a
volunteer.
37.

The Notice of Lien was filed within the time required by

the mechanics1 lien statute and on or about January 19, 1990,
Plaintiff mailed a copy of said Notice of Lien to Defendants by
certified mail.
38.

The Lien showed what the Plaintiff believed at the time

the Lien was prepared and recorded[that the principal amount due
and owing was the sum of $2,115.00].
The Court having entered its FINDINGS OF FACT, hereby enters
its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the District Court had jurisdiction over the above-

entitled matter.
2.

That Plaintiff's lien filed in the above-entitled lien

is void and unenforceable.
3.

That there was no contract existing between the Plaintiff

and the Defendants and therefore no bond was necessary.
4.

That the Plaintiff is entitled to the sunfjof $1,959.60

on the theory of unjust enrichment.
5.

That

the

Defendant

has

previously ^tendered

to ^the

Plaintiff $2,040.00 leaving a net amount due and owing to the
Defendant of $80.40.
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6.

That the Defendant is entitled to receive back the check

previously deposited with the Court in the amount of $3,355.10.
7.

That neither party is entitled to attorney's fees or

court costs.
DATED this fL?

day of

1991.

/£-+*J-TS-

NOTICE
To:

Paul Franklin Farr
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Busch Forum, Suite 540
5295 South 320 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711

You are hereby notified that pursuant to the rules of the
Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504, you have five (5) days after
receipt of these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Judgment to file an Objection.
DATED this / 7 ^ d a y of Qfrfa>*^

c:\wp\docs\imsc\morgan. fof
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'

1991.

Paul Franklin Farr (#1040)
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 540
BUSCH FORUM
5295 South 320 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711
Telephone: (801) 263-5555
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH

FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED,
INC.,

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

Civil No. 900747303CN

)

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Plaintiff,
v.
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN
P. MORGAN,
Defendants.

TO THE PARTIES HERETO, BY AND THROUGH
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND TO THE COURT:

THEIR

RESPECTIVE

YOU are hereby notified that the above-entitled Plaintiff hereby appeals to
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the Order and Judgment entered in this
action on October 29,1991.

DATED this 26th day of December, 1991.
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed, first class, postage prepaid to:
Steve C. Vanderlinden, Esq.
1133 North Main, Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84041
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NOTICE:

JAN 1 9 1990

SEND COPY CF NOTICE CF LIEN BY CERTIFIED MAIL,
EETuEN RECEIPT REQUESTED, TC CWKER.

The undersigned Floor Coverings by Certified, Inc.
hereby g i v e s notice of intention to hold and d a r n a l i e n upon
the property and improvements thereon owned and reputed to be
owned by Stzcey
B. & K r i s t i n P. Morgan
and located

in
~Davis
County/ Utan, waica property i s mere
particularly as follows:

SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A"

Exhibit "A" i s attached hereto and incorporated
herein bv reference. The amount demanded hereby i s
$ $ 2 , 1 1 5 . 0 0 owing to the undersigned for labor and materials
to improve the above described property.
The undersigned was employed by Stacy B & K r i s t i n P. Morgan
who was the (owner) (contractor)/ suca being done by toe
undersigned under a contract made between said (owner)
(contractor) and the undersigned by the terns and conditions of
waica the undersigned did agree to furnish floor coverings in
consideration of-payment to the undersigned of $ $2,115.00
upon completion of the job and under which contract the f i r s t
labor and materials were finished on the 15th
day
of
November , 19a 9 and the l a s t labor and materials were
furnisned on the I7thday of November 1S8J£ 2nd for a l l of
which labor and materials the undersigned became entitled to
$ $ 2 , 1 1 5 . 0 9 which i s the reasonable value thereof, and on
wfaica payments have been made and credits ard offsets allowed
^ anounting t o $ "?~ •
„ ^ e a y * n g a fca^anc2 owii^s to the
C-.*l?^ersigned of $$2 + 113.00 after deducting a l l just credits
^Q^^Bn^/bf&ets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and
^ ^ v & a l i ^ ^ y i l e n by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, Title
Sr^^a^OfcfiPCdcte Annotated 1953.

• y.i^sEnBsr 1::v*

(SEAL)
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COVERINGS BY

fetSorized

Officer
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STATS OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake)

ss.

ft

"before me, the undersigned notary,
On this
day 01
personally appeared AI
ilan Deiantmty, Vice
II
President of Floor Coverings
by Certified, Inc., who is personally known to me (or whose identity
was satisfactorily proved to me) to be the person who signed the
preceding document in my presence and who swore or affirmed to me
that he signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose, that the document
is truthful, and that the document was signed on behalf of said
corporation by the authority of a Resolution of the corporations
board of directorsand acknowledged that the corporation executed
the same and that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation.

..4

Xr.

Xv

j&\t\\±P

SToESry^rublic
,ary ruoxic
j
j
My Commission Expires: Of&C'J/'*—*
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April 4, 1990
To Whom It May Concern;
This is in reply to summons served upon Stacey and Kristin Morgan
regarding Floor Coverings by Certified, Inc., vs., Stacey B.
Morgan and Kristin P. Morgan. On November 24, 1989, we purchased
a home from Richard Miles Construction and Development. Prior to
purchase, Miles Co. authorized us to make arrangements for floor
coverings to be installed at 773 S. 825 E. Layton. We made an
agreement with Don Smith for floor coverings. The agreement
included price and quantity. Don Smith then contacted Floor
Coverings and instructed them to contact us to arrange for
installation.
Upon receipt of an invoice for service and material on or about
December 1, 1989, we forwarded the invoice to Miles Co. At that
time we contacted Floor Coverings-" regarding discrepancies in
billing and unsatisfactory work. Floor Coverings subsequently
contacted us again, whereby we contacted Miles Co. regarding
payment. Floor Coverings then sent preliminary notice to lien,
whereby we again contacted Miles Co. regarding payment. Floor
Coverings subsequently attached lien to property while disputes
regarding billing and service still existed.
After lien was filed, Miles Co. sent us a check for an amount
they determined was reasonable. We are still in possession of
this check and do not wish to redeem or endorse as it may absolve
Miles Co. of further liability. On March 23, 1990, we reached an
agreement with Floor Coverings regarding disputed invoice and.
service.
We are in the process of attempting to have Miles Co. pay
interest, court fees, and attorney fees for which they are
responsible. At no time in the period from November 8, 1989 to
March 23, 1990 did we represent ourselves as anything but agents
of Miles Co., which we were duly authorized to be. During this
time, Miles Co. made no or little effort to pay the bill in a
timely manner nor did they attempt to resolve any billing
discrepancies in a timely manner. Floor Coverings.by Certified
knew of the agency relationship between us and Miles Co,, yet
they made no attempt to collect against Miles CoT, who was the
bonded owner of the said property when said floor coverings were
installed.
Response to Allegations
#4 We were not the owners of property located at 773 S 825 E.
Layton when flooring was installed in said property.
#5 Contract was never entered into by us with Floor Coverings-

#16 Never at any time did we act as general contractor. We were
authorized by general contractor (Miles Co.) to act as an agent
to procure floor covering.
#21 General contractor did obtain bond for work performed.
#3o We were not unjustly enriched as we paid general contractor
for floor coverings when we purchased the property.

Stacey B. and Kristin P. Morgan
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Recommended Forms of Notary Certificates

vuu.i

I.WOUIJ

IUUIIV,

uuiuc,

I M C Lawb

Ul

ULdll

drill

TUU.

State of Utah, Department of Business Regulation, Division
of Corporation & Commercial Code. Spring 1988.

A. If the signer is personally known to the notary:
C. If the signer took an oath vouching for the truthfulness of the document.
In die County of
this

, State of Utah, on
day of

, 19

,

In the County of

before me, the undersigned notary, personally appeared
(signer's name)

, State of Utah, on this

of
, who is

personally known by mc to be the person whose name is signed on the
preceding document, and acknowledged to me that he /she signed it
voluntarily for its stated purpose.

19

day

, before me, the undersigned

notary, personally appeared

(signer's name)

who is personally known to me on "who proved to me his/her identity
through documentary evidence in the form of a
to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and the
document truthful.

Notary signature and seal
Notary signature and seal
B. If the signer proved his/her identity through documentary evidence:
D. If notarizing that the document is a true and correct copy of the original:
In the County of
day of

. State of Utah, on this
, 19

,

before mc, the undersigned notary, personally appeared
name)

In the County of
(signer's

, who proved to mc his/her identity through

documentary evidence in the form of a

m

day of

, State of Utah, on the
19

, I certify that the preceding document

is a true, complete, and unaltered photocopy made by
of

(description of document)

to be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document, and
acknowledged to mc that he/she signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose.
Notary signature and seal
Notary signature and seal
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